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Lucretius’ arguments on the swerve and free-action 
 
Abstract: 
In his version of atomism, Lucretius made explicit reference to the concept of an intrinsic 
declination of the atom, the atomic swerve (clinamen in Latin), stressing that the time and space 
of the infinitesimal atomic vibration is uncertain. The topic of this article is the Epicurean and 
Lucretian arguments in favour of the swerve. Our exposition of the Lucretian model of the 
atomic clinamen will present and elucidate the respective considerations on the alleged role of 
the swerve in the generation of free-action.  
 
1. Fall and clinamen 
The Greek alchemists distinguished two models of material analysis: either the traditional 
method of the research for the four basic elements, respectively earth, water, fire and air; or the 
competing model that suggested that all material substances consist of atoms. The advantage 
of the atomist model was that it explained the phenomena that we classify under the general 
term of secondary qualities, for instance, color, taste, smell and sound, which were still not 
measurable as the primary qualities, namely, solidity, extension, motion, number and figure. 
Color, according to Democritus, was the effect of the turning and inclination of the shapes of 
the atoms. This declination of the atomic shape obtained more significance with Epicurus and 
Lucretius. 
Philodemus, Cicero, Lucretius, Plutarch, Aetius, Diogenes of Oenoanda, Galen, 
Plotinus and Augustine, conveyed that Epicurus introduced the model of the atomic clinamen 
(παρέγκλισις), as an impulsive indeterminacy in the motion of the undividable atom. This 
atomic swerve should be regarded as an internalization of the universal atomic motion in every 
single solid and indestructible atom, causing collisions and joining compounds and bodies. 
With the form of the smallest rare particles of the mind, the atomic swerve is also responsible 
for the generation of volition.  
Epicurean atomism was sorely conjoined with an ethical training that placed freedom 
and spontaneity at the center of human morality, as Farrington (1965) noted. The natural 
principle of the atomic declination (swerve) was considered as a prerequisite of free action. 
Therefore, the swerve of the atoms that constitute the minds and bodies of the agents was taken 
as the cause of agents’ volitions, whereas alternative interpretations either insisted to a temporal 
only relationship between volition and swerve, or dismissed any kind of significant relationship 
(Purinton, 1999).  
The official proponent of the atomic swerve model is Lucretius, while Epicurus is 
related to the doctrine only through secondary resources, such as Cicero and Plutarch. 
Lucretius, however, regarded Epicurus as his respectable master and proclaimed that he 
followed his teachings. Given this claim of Lucretius, the Epicurean proposition on the atomic 
swerve could be taken as the mature outcome of reflection on the natural knowledge of the 
atoms and the void, while in the extant writings of Epicurus we find only implicit reference to 
the atomic swerve: 
The atoms move continuously forever, and some separate far from each other, 
while others remain vibrating, whenever they happen to be locked in by 
interweaving or encased by atoms that tend to interweave. 
This is because the nature of the void separates each of them and is unable to 
provide resistance, and their actual solidity makes the rebound from the collision 
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extend as far as the surrounding entanglement allows the return from the collision. 
There is no beginning to these (rebounds), since the atoms and the void are eternal 
(Epicurus, LH, 43-44). 
The dynamic interplay between the void and the atoms might have always been a hidden 
premise of atomism. From the early stages of atomic theory, Leucippus had made clear that the 
building of the worlds is the result of the entanglement of sinking bodies in empty space, while 
the light of the sun and the stars is caused by their velocity (Diogenes Laertius, 1921b). Aware 
of substantial regularities in nature, the philosophers Anaxagoras, Empedocles and the 
Atomists proposed the conservation of matter, as one of their principles of natural knowledge. 
They also discovered one of the boldest and most interesting riddles in the history and 
philosophy of science, namely, the hypothesis of the void. According to Melissus, void would 
equal to nothing, therefore, it does not exist. On the other side, the Atomists Leucippus, 
Democritus and Epicurus accepted the existence of the void between atoms (Furley, 1987). 
Void, according to Leucippus and Democritus, can neither touch nor be touched.1 The endless 
fall of the atoms into infinite void and the different weights of the atoms cooperate to the 
production of collisions and vortices that give birth to new worlds.  
The objection raised by Aristotle was that in a vacuum all bodies must fall with equal 
velocity. In such a case, not only collisions but also motion in itself would be impossible, since 
motion is primarily the effect of the impulse and the shape of a body.2 Epicurus answered to 
this problem by postulating a swerve of atoms (παρέγκλισις) that causes sideway motion and 
lateral collisions rather than vertical ones. Furthermore, Lucretius used the thought experiment 
of fall into the void with equal speed as a proof for the existence of the Epicurean swerve (DRN, 
2.216-250). A different opinion had been expressed by Aetius3 and Cicero,4 who suggested that 
Democritus ascribed only size and shape to the atoms, whereas Epicurus added weight in order 
to explain atomic motion. While Democritus explained motion exclusively as the outcome of 
collision (παλμόν), Epicurus introduced two additional motions, one on account of the weight 
and one of the swerves, as Aetius (I, 23, 4) believed. Cicero also maintained that Democritus 
would never use the terms “top” and “bottom” to describe the movement of the atoms in the 
void. Aristotle, however, in the fourth book of De Caelo, claimed that if atomic weight were 
determined by the amount of solid or the scarcity of void, then the atoms should move 
downward. If atomic weight were determined by the amount of void or the scarcity of solid, 
then they should move upwards (De Caelo, IV 2, 309a33–b4). With that argumentation, 
Aristotle wanted to criticize the indifference of the single-edged atomic principle for 
diversification of natural movement to more than one direction, which would permit elements 
to be either absolutely light, as fire, or absolutely heavy, as earth, or relatively light, as air, or 
relatively heavy, as water. Contrary to the atomists, Aristotle supposed that “fire in any quantity 
will be lighter than earth in any quantity, while equally any quantity of air, no matter how large, 
will move downwards more slowly than any quantity of water, no matter how small” (O’Brien, 
1981: p. 28). The Epicurean and Lucretian version of atomism needed, therefore, to consider 
Aristotle’s critique.  
 
                                                          
1 On the contrary, Aristotle considered that void does not exist, while the first principle can touch but cannot be 
touched. 
2 Phys. IV, 8, 216a12-21; Letting & Urmson, 2014: p. 204 
3 I, 3, 18; I, 12, 5-7 (Diels, 1879; Kirk & Raven, 1957) 
4 De fato, 20, 46; De finibus, I, 6, 17 
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1.1. Lucretius’ arguments on the spontaneous atomic swerve 
In the second book of De rerum natura, Lucretius developed two arguments in favour of the 
atomic swerve,5 a natural force that justifies collisions, the formation of macroscopic bodies, 
and the initiation of free-action. The first argument is a cosmological one: if the swerve did not 
exist, the atoms, “as their own weight bears them down,”6 would plumb “like drops of rain, 
through the deep void” (DRN, 2.216-224). The swerve evokes a slight declination from the 
background gravitational condition of nature, changing the atomic movements and allowing to 
produce the collisions and blows of the primal elements of nature. The most general form of 
the cosmological argument is a modus tollens from the observable (ἐναργές) to the 
unobservable (ἄδηλον) that begins with the premise: “If the atoms did not swerve, there would 
be no collisions and no macroscopic bodies” (O’Keefe, 1996, p. 307).  
The second argument is a causal one: the motion of the swerve can sunder the covenants 
of fate and, “besides all blows and weight,” may urge creatures to follow the desires of mind 
and free-will (DRN, 2.251-293). As nothing can arise from nothing, according to Epicureans, 
the spontaneous nature of free-action provides evidence for the existence of the swerving 
motion. This clinamen is a “change of direction in the movement of an atom,” according to 
Deleuze (1994: p. 184). The swerve of the atoms occurs at uncertain times and places; 
otherwise Nature would never have created anything, as Lucretius suggested (DRN, 2.216-
293). The swerve is a small (paulum) deviation, just to the extent as to call it merely a change 
of trend.7 The atomic deviation is invisible and infinitesimal, it cannot extend the limits of 
ἐλάχιστον, since oblique motion is, in principle, incompatible with gravity. As Serres (2000) 
observes, the Lucretian clinamen is, potentially and actually, infinitely small, a differential, a 
fluxion, “not more than the least possible” (DRN, 2.244).  
Lucretius agreed with Democritus and Epicurus that the sporadic disturbance of the 
gravitational atomic cascade appears as a turbulence and vortex. The argumentation of 
Lucretius originates entirely from Epicurus, as Farrell (2007) remarks, while the critiques focus 
mainly: a) on the supposed linkage between atomic swerve and human free-will, and b) the 
Lucretian interpretation of the cosmological argument that the swerve provides a start for 
atomic collisions. Nevertheless, Epicurus, in his Letter to Herodotus (43-44), stated clearly that 
the atomic motion is everlasting. The alleged start of the collisions, therefore, may only refer 
to each one of the infinitely many worlds, everytime a world emerges to reality.  
In the following chapters we analyze the conceptual problems of the swerve and free-
action. The research focuses on the significance of the swerve and free-action in the atomist 
philosophy of Lucretius - do they belong to the main principles at all? Further on, we examine 
the argumentation that connects the atomist principles with the swerve and free-action, the 
relationships between the notions of swerve, spontaneity, and chance, and the significance of 
the swerve for sign inference. The central research question inquires the compatibility of the 
swerve with moral responsibility. 
We advance the research on this Lucretian thematic with a discussion and analysis of 
the given definitions and interpretations of the “swerve” or “clinamen” in relation to “free-
action,” and their basic origins and influences, such as from Epicurus. We present the 
arguments and criticize their positioning in the general framework of the atomic concepts, the 
different attempts to judge them, and the probable solutions to problems that appeared, such as 
the limited divisibility and finite analysis of matter, the rejection of both material and structural 
continuum (Sedley, 1999), and the method of exhaustion, which motivated the discovery of the 
atomic theory. The Lucretian clinamen, as an inclination and free will of the atomic swerving 
                                                          
5 Latin: “clinamen,” “declinare,” “depellere,” “inclinare” 
6 Both Epicurus and Lucretius explain that the term “down” is only relative, as the universe has infinite size. 
7 tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis; DRN, 2.219-20 
3 
 
(Johnson, 2017), constitutes a thought-provoking question for philosophical research. Below, 
I will present primary and secondary references on this outstanding Epicurean topic, making 
also the respective critical examination clearer and more distinct. 
 
1.2.  The questions of atomic movement and causation 
The concept of the atomic swerve may have its origin in the property of the turning of the 
atomic shapes, which was introduced by Democritus. The whirling movement of the atoms had 
been identified by Democritus as necessity, as Diogenes Laertius conveyed. In his work On 
Mind, Leucippus contended that: “Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and 
by necessity.”8 Leucippus and Democritus treated the atom and the void as the material causes 
of things. The rareness and the density of the underlying substance corresponds, according to 
the first Atomists, to the cause of all other qualities.  
Thus, the elementary differences are three; shape, order, and position. “For they say the 
real is differentiated only by ‘rhythm’ and ‘inter-contact’ and ‘turning’; and of these, rhythm 
is shape, intercontact is order, and turning is position; for A differs from N in shape, AN from 
NA in order, M from W in position,” as Aristotle (Meta. 1, 4) suggested. Hence, the perceived 
colors of the objects, according to Democritus, are only appearances that result from the turning 
of the shapes of atoms (GC 1, 2). It is no coincidence, I think, that Hugh Tredennick gave 
another translation of the aforementioned passage of Aristotle (1933): “These differences they 
say are three: shape, arrangement, and position; because they hold that what is differs only in 
contour, intercontact, and inclination.” Turning, therefore, is nothing else but inclination, 
synonymous to the Lucretian atomic swerve.  
However, Aristotle criticized the first Atomists, because they casually neglected the 
question of movement, as all other earlier thinkers. Epicurus agreed with his precursors “that 
the atoms possess none of the properties of phenomenal objects except shape, weight, and size, 
and whatever necessarily goes along with shape” (Epicurus, LH, 54). He also insisted on causal 
explanations and terms that are actually in use in modern quantum mechanics theory, for 
instance, the terms “collision,” “rebound,” “entanglement,” “vibration,” and “interweaving.” 
The subject matter of atomic motion was analyzed by Lucretius in the verses 62-332 of the 
second book of De rerum natura. The swerve of atoms is the beginning of a new movement at 
no determinate time and place (DRN, 2.218–19), contravening any sequence of antecedent 
causes (2.251–5). At a first stage, the whole idea of the atomic swerve doctrine, according to 
Epicurus and Lucretius, presupposes a background of a vertical gravitational motion inherent 
to every atom, while any other kind of motion, aside from gravity, is conceived as an 
infinitesimal swerve at directions other than the gravitational. This diversification of motion 
diminishes the likelihood of deterministic effects. 
The refutation of determinism is the most significant consequence of the introduction 
of the doctrine of the atomic swerve, as Sedley (1983) remarked. Comparing the remnants of a 
part (probably XXXV) of the Epicurean work On nature, found at Herculaneum, and the 
passage 4.469-521 from De rerum natura, Sedley pointed out that Epicurus did not believe that 
the seeds of human character have a deterministic impact on our future development. We 
ourselves are responsible for our behaviour, by issuing praise and blame in everyday social 
action. Instead of wild animals, moral agents are not predetermined by any kind of congenital 
disposition, or the constraints of the environment.  
The argument of both Epicurus and Lucretius is based on the self-refutation of the 
opponents, either sceptics or determinists, who stand upside-down back-to-front, turning a 
                                                          
8 Aetius, I, 25, 4 (Diels, 1879; Kirk & Raven, 1957) 
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somersault. The defence of scepticism presupposes knowledge; the defence of determinism 
presupposes undetermined agents; therefore, both pertain to self-refuting commitments, while 
the preconception is taken as criterion: “What created the preconception of true and false?” 
asks Lucretius (4.473-7), allowing thus for a cognitive faculty of the swerving bodies. 
Similarly, Epicurus shows that the determinist cannot prove the falsity of our preconception of 
human agency. For these reasons, the impulse and the auxiliary element in us is considered by 
Epicurus as the cause within us, which is denied by determinists. 
None the less, the swerve of the atoms was criticized by the opponents of the Epicureans 
as an “uncaused motion.” The leader of the platonic Academy Carneades had tried to escape 
determinism and simultaneously refute the validity of the Epicurean theory of the swerve. 
Carneades thought that the Epicurean swerve did not offer any satisfying solution to the 
problem of free action, since randomness is not the form of human freedom, as Hankinson 
(1999b) remarks.  
A long-winded argumentation against the atomic swerve doctrine had been developed 
by the Stoics and Cicero, as well. If every Stoic proposition (axioma) were either true or false, 
then everything would take place by preceding causes and uncaused motion could not exist. 
But the Epicureans rejected the validity of causal determinism and fate, by preferring to give 
up bivalence, that is to say, rejecting the requirement for truth-falsity of propositions regarding 
the future, because the opposite opinion that everything is caused by fate would be intolerable. 
It would be, however, ignorance of logical method, as Cicero (De fato, 21; 37) conveys,  to 
agree with Epicurus that not every proposition is either true or false. Accordingly, Cicero 
rejected the views of Epicurus on the swerve: 
But Epicurus thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of an atom; 
and so, in addition to gravity and impact there arises a third form of motion, when 
the atom swerves sideways a minimal space (termed by Epicurus elachiston). Also, 
he is compelled to profess in reality, if not quite explicitly, that this swerve takes 
place without cause (Cicero, De fato, 22).  
Taking the argumentation of Carneades seriously, Cicero complained that he could not accept 
an uncaused motion, as the swerve of the atoms. Cicero did not agree that universal motion, 
the solidity of the atoms, and the lack of resistance from the vacuum, were sufficient 
explanations of the generation of the atomic swerve. He suggested that Epicurus introduced 
this theory because of his fear lest, if the atom was always carried along by its natural and 
necessary gravity, no freedom would be left for us, since the mind will move under compulsion 
from the atoms (Cicero, De fato, 23). In the first book of De finibus, Cicero blamed the model 
of the atomic swerve, with the following words:  
he [Epicurus] said that the atom makes a very tiny swerve, - the smallest divergence 
possible; and so are produced entanglements and combinations and cohesions of 
atoms with atoms, which result in the creation of the world and all its parts, and of 
all that in them is. Now not only is the whole of this affair a piece of childish fancy, 
but it does not even achieve the result that its author desires. The swerving is itself 
an arbitrary fiction; for Epicurus says the atoms swerve without a cause, - yet this 
is the capital offense in a natural philosopher, to speak of something taking place 
uncaused (Cicero, De finibus, 1.19). 
Pointing out to counter arguments in favor of divine providence, Cicero stated that the cohesion 
of the atoms and the beauty of the world could not be explained by the riotous hurly-burly of 
the alleged atomic swerve. Furthermore, Cicero believed that the infinite divisibility of matter 
was an indispensable natural principle (op. cit.). He also contended that the swerve was only a 
device to escape from determinism and save freedom of will (De natura Deorum, 1.69). Cicero 
regarded Carneades’ theory of causation as much more successful, since it allowed for a special 
voluntary power of the mind rather than the arbitrariness of the atoms. Since there is still 
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something in our own power, it is not the case that whatever happens, happens through fate 
(Cicero, De fato, 31).  
In general, universal causation, fate, and determinism have strong linkages with each 
other, although they are not identical. Responsibility is still conceivable in the frames of 
universal causation, but its meaning becomes more restricted with determinism and vanishes 
with fatalism. The related deterministic conundrums obtain their severest expression in the case 
of the likelihood of future contingents. Carneades and Chrysippus did not accept necessitation 
for future events, with the exception of the ones that may be caused and thus fated. Democritus 
yet preferred, according to Cicero’s opinion, to explain the natural movements in a 
deterministic manner. Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle were all fatalists, as 
Cicero (De fato, 29) believed. The atomic swerve doctrine, on the contrary, would propose a 
libertarian resolution to the problem of future contingents, permitting uncertain timing and 
placing of the atomic movements. 
 
1.3.  Elachiston, variation and the adventitious 
The discussion of the paradoxes of the continuum and the related method of exhaustion played 
a significant role to the introduction of the atomic swerve doctrine. Through successive 
attempts to approximate the magnitude of observed phenomena, ancient science discovered the 
concepts of the minimum (ἐλάχιστον) and the limit. The development of the concept of the limit 
was an Epicurean contribution, according to Lucretius. The “lively intellect” of Epicurus 
prevailed, as he brought “report of what can be and what cannot, and in what manner each thing 
has a power that’s limited, and deep-set boundary mark” (DRN, 1.75-77) and “with words of 
truth he purged men’s hearts and set a limit to desire and fear” (DRN, 6.24-5). Hence, the 
philosophical conception of the indestructible atoms revealed, as a principle, what is possible 
and what is impossible, “how everything has finite power and deep-set boundary mark” (op. 
cit. 1.594-6; 5.88-90; 6.65-7). The Lucretian concept of the limit is applied both to ethics and 
physical philosophy: 
Again, since a limit has been set 
For the growth of things and for their hold on life, 
Each after its kind, and since it stands decreed 
What each by nature can do and cannot, 
And nothing changes, but all things are constant… 
They must for sure consist of changeless matter. 
For if the primal atoms could suffer change, 
Under some strange compulsion, then no more 
Would certainty exist of what can be 
And what cannot, in a word how everything 
Has finite power and deep-set boundary mark 
(DRN, 1.584-595). 
Limit, therefore, complies with the principle of the conservation of matter, the 
indestructibility of atoms, and the possibility to obtain scientific certainty. The necessity for a 
limit (finis) is a substantial argument for Lucretius, since he blames his opponents, like 
Anaxagoras, that “they acknowledge no limit at all to the splitting of things, nor respite to their 
breaking, nor any least of things, the primal atoms” (DRN, 1.746-8; 1.844).  
The differentiation of the shapes of the bodies is the result of the addition of minimal 
parts, for example, from the top to the bottom and from the left to the right, as Lucretius (DRN, 
2.488) remarks. Limit’s counterpart is variation, corresponding to the concept παραλλαγὴ 
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according to Epicurus9 and Philodemus,10 and the term ποικίλος according to Philodemus (De 
signis, 20; 25-26). This ubiquitous phenomenon of variation, the perceived instability of things 
and events that are found enclosed by the boundaries, can undermine traditional philosophical 
endeavours to transcendence and put questions on the validity of inductive inference. However, 
it does not sacrifice necessity to arbitrary chance. The fundamental reality of the atomic swerve 
is a blending of instances of free-action, encounter, alteration and counterfactual 
interconnection with determinate causality and deep-set regularity. Lucretius, that is, connected 
the introduction of the infinitesimal swerve with the impossibility of oblique vertical motion, 
insisting on the contribution of the adventitious, as the swerve was called by Plutarch (Stoic 
self-contradictions, Moralia, 1045 ff.), rather than a literal interpretation of the atomic 
inclination: 
that the atoms must swerve slightly, but only to an infinitesimal degree, or we shall 
give the impression that we are imagining oblique movements - a hypothesis that 
would be contradicted by the facts. For it is a plain and manifest matter of 
observation that objects with weight, left to themselves, cannot travel an oblique 
course when they plunge from above - at least not perceptibly (DRN, 2.243-9). 
The adventitious variation of the atom, namely, the swerve, has a limit. As we see, Lucretius 
stated that “atoms must swerve slightly, just the very least - no more” (DRN, 2.244). On account 
of the infinitesimal size of the swerve of the atom, Sedley (1976) supposed that Epicureans 
developed an alternative Geometry based on the concept of the “elachiston” (minimum), which 
was absent from the Euclidean Geometry. The term minimum (elachiston) was related with the 
concept of limit as finita potestas, a unifying principle that confines the variety of atoms, their 
size, the behaviour of atomic compounds and the possible atomic combinations, the possible 
shapes and magnitudes of a cosmos, as De Lacy (1969) observed. The concept of the limit 
(peras) is introduced by Epicurus in relation to the circumference and the boundary of a world; 
it points out the limitedness of the shape, location, and duration of a world and its material 
components. In his Letter to Pythocles (88–9), Epicurus defines a world as “a particular 
encompassment of a heaven, encompassing astronomical bodies and earth and all the 
phenomena. It is cut off from the infinite, and terminates in a limit.” The universe as a whole, 
however, it is impossible to have such an extremity (extremo), because, in that case, it would 
need something outside of it, some clear point beyond to limit it (DRN, 1.960). In the Lucretian 
poem the corresponding notions “limit” (finis; finiat) and “boundary-mark” (terminus haerens) 
denote the regularity of nature. They are conceived in an abstract manner that does not forbid 
the infinity of the atoms and the infinite universe, as logical exception and absolute variation.  
The terms variety, variable, variation, vary, are used by Lucretius in De rerum natura 
for the signification of differences of the names of primal things, of their habits, of the shapes 
of the body, of the power of substances to support life, which varies from one animal to the 
other, in every kind of herbage and every river, differentiated in the various shapes of the seeds, 
which may be mixed in many ways, through varying paths and intervals, as atoms blow through 
infinite time, massed by their own weights, combined in every way, trying every variation. 
Nevertheless, the variety of the shapes of the atoms cannot be very large, there must be a finite 
number of shapes, because of the small size of the atom. From a general point of view, natural 
diversity, as Deleuze (2017) observes, appears in De Rerum Natura mainly in three different 
macroscopic levels: as specificity of the natural species, as individuality of the members of the 
species, and as heterogeneity of the parts that compose an individual. Furthermore, the 
imperceptible deviation of the swerve introduces the radically new philosophical conception 
                                                          
9 LH, 55; 63; Letter to Pythocles, 95; 98; 113 
10 De signis, 6.12; 17.26; 19.20; 21; 23-24; 34.31; 35; 36.17-21; 38.5 
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that “everything is an encounter.” The atomic swerve as an encounter is considered as able to 
give rise to the creation of the world, as Althusser (2015) states. 
In modern atomism, the sudden, unpredictable, uncaused atomic swerve has been 
assimilated to the concept of quantum. “‘Quantum’ is more than mere metaphor here; the 
evidence suggests that the swerve involves the minimal possible divergence from the atom’s 
previous trajectory,” as Hankinson (1999b) supports. Nevertheless, Aristotle, in Physics VI 10, 
had already mentioned that the motion of a part-less entity could necessarily “imply that time 
consists of partless instants and motion of extraordinary discrete jerks” (Bicknell, 1990: p. 
246). In order to avoid this quantization, Aristotle proposed that something part-less could only 
have moved incidentally to the motion of a larger body. Epicurus firstly followed Aristotle on 
this interpretation, but later changed his mind and the Epicureans accepted the staccato motion 
of part-less entities, according to commentaries of Simplicius (On Aristotle’s Physics, 934, 23-
30: “the Epicureans… say that magnitude, motion and time are [all] made of partless things, 
and that a moving thing does move over the whole magnitude that is constructed of partless 
things, but does not move along each of the partless things”), Themistius (On Aristotle’s 
Physics, 184, 9-28), and Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. X 142).  
 
2. Lucretian universe and the swerve: a closer look to the text 
The quest for the ultimate constituents of matter focused not only on the concept of atom, but 
also on the concepts of the seed and the minimum. The atoms are invisible primordia rerum, 
which are alternatively described by Lucretius as semina, genitalia corpora, and materies.11 
Lucretius rejected Anaxagoras’ view of the seed (theory of homoeomeria), proposing instead 
that change is caused, when seeds common in many things are mingled together in many ways 
(DRN, 1.895). The unpredictable element and the extent of the improvisation of the inanimate 
atomic concilium build up and cultivate multifarious material situations. Therefore, living 
matter, soul and mind, all belong with the more general category of atomic matter.  
The slight swerving of the atoms provokes clashes, rebounds and new trajectories that 
produce atomic complexes. The significance of the doctrine of the swerve is that not only living 
creatures and atomic compounds, but every individual atom is unique. The Lucretian 
description of the swerve as a force that amends gravity, is vindicated by the overriding 
conceptions of a) an infinite universe that is boundless and has no centre, and b) infinite matter. 
The completely solid indestructible particles of matter fly about through all eternity, having no 
limit to their number, wavering in a vacuum that stretches far and wide into immeasurable 
depths and it is not bounded in any direction.  
There is nothing outside the universe, there is no limit and no end or measure of the 
infinite. The eternal, uninterrupted motion of the atoms is caused exactly by the limitlessness 
of the universe, because the atoms cannot find rest in it. If the universe was somehow confined 
and shut in, then all matter would have accumulated at the bottom and all movement would 
cease. However, the universe is an unfathomable abyss of space, where vacuum is bounded by 
body, and body by vacuum. Matter is also necessarily infinite, because space is. Accordingly, 
as Lucretius underlined, the conduct of the atoms is not the result of an act of intelligence or 
stipulation (DRN, 1.921-1051). In the same way, Epicurus thought that the universe is 
boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void (LH, 42) and there are 
infinite worlds (op. cit. 45). Moreover, there can be no center in the infinity. Even if there was 
a center in the unlimited universe, nothing could stand fast there rather than flee from it. The 
                                                          
11 Some instances of this terminology are “semina rerum” (DRN 1.59), “corpora prima” (1.61), “corporibus caecis” 
(1.328), “primordia rerum” (1.268), “minimis partibus” (1.610). 
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yearning for a center would be an exclusive property of moisture and earthly matter, according 
to the followers of Aristotle, while air and fire would find getaways to stream out, away from 
the center. None the less, Lucretius thought that such an imbalance between different materials 
would finally lead to total perdition (DRN, 1.1052-1113).  
 After assuming the significance of the infiniteness of universe and matter, for the 
perpetual movement of the atoms, Lucretius propounds, in the beginning of the second book, 
six postulates of the atomic movement: a) The world is not a plenum, the void exists, since 
matter diminishes and grows endlessly, yet as a sum it is conserved (DRN, 2.67-79). The atoms 
are perpetually on the move in the infinite void, either falling or rebounding, or vibrating, when 
they form compound bodies; those which rebound at small intervals make up stone, iron, while 
those which rebound at larger intervals make up air and sunlight, being the worthy vehicle of 
the transmission of heat (DRN, 2.80-141); b) Solitary solid atoms can move faster than light 
(op. cit. 142-166); c) There is no divine providence (2.167-183); the atoms normally slope 
downwards through undisturbed vacuum at equal speed; nothing can move upwards of its own 
force (2.184-215); d) Sometimes they swerve slightly from the vertical course at no determinate 
time or place, this is the clinamen. Without swerve there would be no collisions and 
macroscopic bodies (2.216-250) and no free will, as fatis avulsa voluntas (2.251-293); e) The 
atomic congestion, the density of the universe was always so big as it is now - there is 
conservation of the sum of matter and motion, the atomic motion has always been the same 
(2.294-307); f) Phenomenal immobility of matter is an optical illusion (2.308-332).  
In the next verses, Lucretius puts forward six other propositions about the varieties in 
the size and shape of atoms and their compounds (op. cit. 2.333-1022). The atoms themselves 
are devoid of color (2.730-841), heat, sound, savor, and odor (2.842-864), and sentience (2.865-
990). It is not, therefore, the blackness of the atoms that renders some bodies black; nor 
laughing atoms make humans laugh. Lucretius uses the metaphor of the poetic verses to explain 
how the combinations of atoms provoke temporary phenomenal manifestations (op. cit. 
1.1013-14). Since the specific seeds that constitute the bodies are not identical, they must differ 
in their intervals, paths, attachments, weights, impacts, clashes and motions, as Lucretius 
contends. However, the primitive atoms of matter are essentially indestructible, hard and 
insentient. Nature is self-regulating, without interference from the gods (DRN, 2.1090-1104) 
and the world was created by a conflux of atoms swept along in various ways through infinite 
time by mutual clashes and combinations (op. cit. 5.416-508).    
 
3. Counterarguments and alternative views 
Notwithstanding the scorn of the Lucretian ex contrario argumentation, the model of the atomic 
swerve met often with disagreements. One of the obstacles to understand the theory of the 
atomic swerve, according to Englert (1981; 1987), is that Lucretius conjectured that the swerve 
explains the existence of libera voluntas (DRN, 2.216-293). Whether it would be the cause of 
voluntas, an instrument of it, before or after voluntas, or a prerequisite of its generation, it 
varies at several interpretations. Englert compared two different explanations of the connection 
between swerve and libera voluntas: a) Following the view of the nineteenth century 
intellectual Carlo Giussani (1896), Cyril Bailey stated that: “The fortuitous indeterminate 
movement of the individual atoms in the void is in the conscious complex (concilium) of the 
mind transformed into an act of deliberate will” (Bailey, 1928: p. 320). The element of 
spontaneity enables the meeting of atoms in their downward motion, preserves the occurrence 
of chance in inorganic matter, the emergence of consciousness “in the sensitive aggregate of 
the atoms of the mind” and of free choice in human conduct (Bailey, 1947: pp. 17-18). The 
swerve, even so, is not the instrument of free choice but only its precondition, as De Lacy 
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(1969) commends. b) A competing interpretation expressed Furley (1967): the swerve plays 
no direct role in voluntary action. The effect of the swerve in human soul’s pattern of atoms is 
nothing more than a slight declination from the rigid determination due to birth. More precisely, 
Furley believed that the swerve was not introduced to preserve free or deliberate choice, but 
only as a random alteration of character. Lucretius respectively offers examples of heredity to 
support his views (DRN, 4.1209-32).  
Englert dismissed both of these interpretations, because they do not explain how exactly 
the swerve relates to voluntary action, deliberate choice, and free choice. He insisted that the 
notion of the swerve allows Epicurus to distinguish between the voluntary and the forced 
actions of living beings. It has nothing to do with free will and deliberate choice, but only with 
voluntary action applicable to all living creatures. Regarding the aforementioned dispute, the 
supposed contradiction between the physical explanation of an atomic swerve and the ethical 
postulation of free action, would still remain apprehensive, if Lucretian worldview were 
dualistic. Lucretius, however, insisted that “the spontaneous swerve of moving matter is 
contained entirely in the materiality of the movement itself and does not come from outside. 
By contrast, modern atomism introduced the metaphysical concept of ‘force’ and the idealist 
concept of ‘mind’,” as Nail (2018: p. 8) remarks. Lucretian atomism was a monistic empirical 
theory, constructed on the basis of observations, preconceptions (prolepseis), and sensations of 
the universal turbulence (clinamen, swerve) of matter. In this monistic conceptual framework, 
the notion of the swerve could be inferred by miscellaneous phenomena of turmoil, vibration, 
free-action, and differentiation. From this perspective, the experiences of pain and pleasure are 
explained as dislocations and readjustments of atomic arrangements and motions, taking place 
in body and soul alike, such as the feeling of “calm that denotes atomic equilibrium” (Bailey, 
1947: p. 18).  
Furthermore, the assumed consequence between the atomic swerve in the perceived 
phenomena and the production of free choice in human soul, can be disclosed through the 
Lucretian Theory of Knowledge and the Epicurean Ethics of a personal way of life. In the 
fourth book of De rerum natura, Lucretius refers to the fine particles of external objects that 
strike our senses (DRN, 4.26-214). The emitted simulacra are extremely subtle films that move 
with astonishing speed and create mental images (εἴδωλα) that preserve the surface properties 
of the objects from which they emanate (op. cit. 4.215-819). The contacting and striking images 
of things, as foreseen by the mind, can affect will and initiate voluntary action (op. cit. 4.877-
96). 
The empirical and materialistic epistemology of Epicurean atomism identified truth 
with perception. According to Detel (1975), Epicurus’ theory that all perceptions are true, was 
based on the proposition that a perception X is true, if there exists a small picture (εἴδωλον) Y, 
such that X is triggered by Y. Aside from perceptions, Epicurus acknowledged preconceptions 
(prolepseis) and feelings as criteria of truth, while the later Epicureans added the 
representations of the imagination, as Diogenes Laertius delivers. The notion of evidence 
(enargeia), based on sense perception, is the common basis of the threefold Epicurean criteria 
of truth (Ierodiakonou, 2011; Diogenes Laertius, 1921b, 10, 31; 33; 52). Regarding these 
criteria, an enlightening extant passage comes from Democritus:  
According to him [Democritus] there are three criteria, namely, for the knowledge 
of ἄδηλα [unobservable states of affairs], the appearances - for the appearances 
allow us to see what is unapparent, as Anaxagoras says, for which Democritus 
praises him - for inquiry, the concept - for with everything, my child, there is one 
starting point: to know what the inquiry is about - for choice and avoidance, the 
feelings; for what we perceive as familiar is to be chosen, while what seems alien 
is to be avoided (Sextus Empiricus, M, VII, 140).  
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The counterarguments to the Epicurean Theory of Knowledge have pointed out mainly 
to: a) the problems of the Epicurean solipsism arising from the principle that all perceptions 
are true, b) the required causal jump from the observable to the unobservable in the Atomistic 
Physics and Psychology, and c) the peculiar quarta natura of the Lucretian soul, corresponding 
to the nameless fourth and finest element of the Epicurean soul, which was also composed by 
wind (aura, ventus), heat (vapor, calor), and air or mist (aer). That quartessence should explain 
how the non-sentient body could obtain sensation.  
Nevertheless, Epicurus and Lucretius regarded atoms as the components of everything, 
therefore, of soul, as well. Epicureans believed that the weight and the swerve of the atoms 
explain their natural movement and the formation of their compounds. Rarified bodies, such as 
air and fire, recoil at great distances, as they have large admixture of void. When the recoil 
takes place at shorter distances, there is a different interlacing between components, as either 
in liquids or in solid bodies. For this reason, solid bodies display a constant internal vibration 
of their atoms (LH, 43-44). Soul atoms are indispensable and inherent constituents of the whole 
of human body. Lucretius believed that the speed in the function of mind and soul shows that 
they must be composed of exceptionally small, smooth and round atoms (DRN, 3.177-230). 
The autonomy of the mind is built up, as the swerve in the atoms at an infinitesimal scale 
“annuls the decrees of destiny and prevents the existence of an endless chain of causation,” as 
Lucretius (2.251-6) suggested.  
 From an opposite point of view, Cicero and Plutarch had rejected the doctrine of the 
atomic swerve, because of its dismissal of the role of first cause and providence in the world. 
These critics would focus on the alleged failure of Epicurus to provide a (divine) cause for the 
swerve. None the less, Epicureans rejected divine intervention in mundane matters. They also 
regarded the swerve as a prerequisite of our ability to distinguish between pure and impure 
pleasures. The respective Epicurean ideal of a personal way of life was based on pleasure and 
spontaneity. All creatures, as Lucretius contended, dispose spontaneity, as a detachment from 
fate:  
What is the origin of this free will 
Possessed by living creatures throughout the earth? 
Whence comes, I say, this will-power wrested from the fates 
Whereby we each proceed where pleasure leads, 
Swerving our course at no fixed time or place 
But where the bidding of our hearts directs?  
For beyond doubt the power of the will 
Originates these things and gives them birth 
And from the will movements flow through the limbs 
(DRN, 2.256-263). 
Clearly, the swerving motion in the above cited verses is directly connected with voluntary 
action, falsifying thus Furley’s (1967) interpretation. Epicurus and Lucretius did not offer an 
analytical account of the affection of free choice by the atomic swerve. However, in the 
background of their argumentation rests the belief that the spontaneous and unpredictable 
swerve of atoms and seeds is responsible for the limited determinacy in nature’s creative work. 
Lucretius proposes the example of a child that may resemble one of the parents, a grandparent 
or a remoter ancestor (DRN, 4.1209–32).  
Although he combined spontaneity with natural resourcefulness, Lucretius was not 
superfluously libertarian. He argued that the mortality of soul is fated just as everything that 
obeys the “deep-set boundary mark” of necessity. Lucretius would assume the immutability of 
the atoms as a certainty of natural order (1.584–98). However, the deviation from certainty to 
the relativization of fate could also be justified by the infiniteness of a world that is not 
fatendum, cannot be totally traversed by our senses (1.958-964). Hence, the Lucretian swerve 
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permits living beings to initiate movements that break “the bonds of fate” (fati foedera, DRN, 
2.254), and “tears free will away from fate” (2.257). More vigorously, Epicurus did not want 
to retreat into conceptions of fate of his contemporary natural philosophers. Instead of being 
enslaved to fate or destiny, he would rather prefer to endorse the myths about the gods (Letter 
to Menoeceus, 134). Thus, chance is an opportunity for good, hope, and placation, according 
to Epicurus.  
Because of the rareness of extant Democritean texts, there is also the question, whether 
the Epicurean and Lucretian notion of the swerve may be compatible with the basic 
philosophical principles of Democritus and Leucippus. On regard of this question, an 
alternative interpretation of the swerve is given by Johnson (2013). He overstates a Lucretian 
conception of spontaneous or automatic action that is not to be considered as the result of 
accidental, contingent, indeterminate or random causes, but rather as a natural and necessary 
lack of external cause, influence, purposive intention, control or domination. Homer, 
Herodotus, Thucydides, Theophrastus, Diodorus of Sicily, Ovid, Virgil, the Hippocratic 
corpus, and others, identified spontaneity with the effect of natural causation, by distinguishing 
automatic action from intentional inventiveness and artificial cultivation. The corresponding 
Latin expression for spontaneity, which is persistently used by Lucretius, is ipsa sponte sua 
(2.508, 2.190-2, 2.1158, 3.1041), as Bailey (1947: p. 96) observed. This was exactly 
Democritus’ notion of spontaneity, as a refute of gods, chance, external compulsion, or fate, 
while Epicurus discriminated himself from Democritus, by allowing the role of chance that 
dismisses strict necessitation, as Johnson (2009) insists. The difficulty, however, is that 
Lucretius does not miss out worship to gods, as Venus, for instance.  
An additional ground for distinguishing between Democritean and Epicurean atomism 
would be Aetius’ opinion that Democritus did not consider weight as an atomic property, while 
Epicurus did. Clearly, Aristotle, Theophrastus and Simplicius testified that Democritean atoms 
were not weightless: “Democritus says ‘the more any indivisible exceeds, the heavier it is’ - to 
which we must clearly add ‘and the hotter it is,’” as Aristotle (GC I, 8, 326a10-12) conveyed. 
Aetius yet contended that Democritus regarded only shape and size as atomic properties12 and 
accepted only one kind of atomic motion, that due to collision.13 This way, Democritus could 
imply an unbroken chain of causation over time, where the present motions and collisions are 
direct effects of the previous ones. With a contribution that deflated determinism, Epicurus 
introduced two original kinds of motion, as Aetius stated,14 either because of weight (κατὰ 
στάθμην) or because of the swerve (κατὰ παρέγκλισιν). The bodies, according to Epicurus, are 
indeterminate (ἀπερίληπτα), the first of them simple, their compounds heavy. The atoms, in 
general, move on account of weight, swerve, and collision – rebound (πληγήν - ἀποπαλμόν).15  
 
3.1. Interpretations of the swerve 
In modern atomism, the indeterministic interpretation of the atomic swerve was introduced by 
Guyau (1910), followed by Bailey (1947), De Lacy (1948; 1964; 1969), and Rist (1972). The 
element of randomness or chance, in English, and τύχη or μάτην, in Greek, obtained in 
Democritus and Epicurus the meaning of the absence of any kind of design, end, purpose, goal, 
and aim in the physical world. However, Lucretius recognized that everything has a deep-set 
boundary mark, that is to say, the swerve cannot change the rationale of the elementary laws 
                                                          
12 Aetius, I, 3, 18; I, 12, 5-7 (Diels, 1879) 
13 op. cit. I, 23 3  
14 op. cit. I, 23, 4  
15 op. cit. I, 12, 5  
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of nature (DRN, 5.88–90, 6.64–6). Furthermore, Philodemus (On signs, 36, 11–17), wrote that 
“it is not enough to accept the minimal swerves of atoms on account of what is fortuitous (τὸ 
τυχηρόν) and what is up to us; one must also show that they do not conflict with any evidence.” 
Therefore, contingency, indeterminacy, and spontaneity may have minimal effects to the 
occurrence of natural events, but they influence more significantly human mind and 
psychology, as Long (2006) supports. This way, however, Lucretian atomism would obtain a 
dualistic overwriting, which goes too far against its well-known empirical monism.  
A critical view against the Lucretian belief that free will originates from the atomic 
swerve, takes O’Keefe (2005a). He compares the well-known argument for the existence of the 
swerve on account of free will (DRN, 2.251-93) with the description of voluntary action, when 
we walk, stride forward, as we wish, and move our limbs in various ways: 
I say that in the first-place images 
Of walking come in contact with the mind 
And strike the mind, as I have said before. 
Hence follows will: for no one ever begins 
Anything unless the mind has first foreseen 
What it wills to do (and what the mind foresees 
Is the image of the thing)… 
(DRN, 4.881-9). 
Therefore, suggests Lucretius, the mind, conceiving the wish of walking forward, strikes 
immediately the mass of spirit, which is dispersed through all the body and the limbs. To 
achieve this is easy for it, since it lives in close combination with the spirit. The spirit then 
strikes the body and push it forward into movement. Nevertheless, the initial stimulation 
comes from the external simulacra that impact the mind in a rather deterministic way. That is 
to say, the mechanistic model of atomic motion tends to reduce the swerve and the volition to 
the action of the simulacra. 
As a response to mechanistic objections, the Epicurean swerve has been assimilated 
directly by Asmis (1970; 1990) and indirectly by Englert (1981; 1987) with the Aristotelian 
concept ὄρεξις, namely, the striving that forms the first stage of every voluntary action. 
Lucretius called this act of striving “will” (voluntas), as Asmis (1970) suggested. On regard 
of this problematic, O’Keefe (2005a: p. 31) distinguishes three different interpretations of the 
connection between the atomic swerve and voluntas. According to the internal cause 
interpretation, swerves can preserve free will, by breaking the intercourse of causes and 
effects, which otherwise would necessitate our actions and personality. On the bivalence 
interpretation, swerves can preserve free will, by saving the contingency of the future against 
the threat that everything is predetermined from the past. Thirdly, the traditional interpretation 
identifies swerve with volition, since our volitions are constituted by random swerves that 
result to random actions, which occur undetermined at uncertain times and places, simply 
following our desire for pleasure.  
Against the traditional interpretation of the equivalence between swerve and volition, 
Bobzien (2000) underscored the autonomous role of our minds that move themselves as they 
wish. This preference to the undetermined nature of human mind instead of total randomness, 
has been also accepted by O’Keefe (2005). Another way to interpret the swerve is to regard it 
as posterior to voluntas, as something that voluntas uses after its formation, either through the 
so-called radical emergence interpretation or simply as a tool of voluntas.  
From the aspect of the Philosophy of Design, Brassett and O’Reilly (2018), suggest 
that the concept of the Lucretian swerve is responsible for all nature’s creativity, while the 
actualisation of the swerve as collisions, maintains high significance in models and systems 
of design. The introduction of the concepts of turbulence, chance, chaos, entropy, hence, 
13 
 
creativity, in an ordered universe, created new open systems, different than the old closed 
ones, as stressed by Serres (2000) and Berressem (2005). 
  
4. Sign inference and the swerve 
The empirical turn of the Hellenistic Philosophy was mainly carried on by the Epicureans, who 
suggested that all knowledge is based on sensory experience. They focused on evident truths 
that originate from experience, while distinguishing non-evident matters that stand beyond 
direct apprehension. The analogical argumentation of Epicurus takes the existence of evident 
things such as seeds, as a proof of non-evident theses, as the impossibility of creation ex-nihilo. 
With this analogical model, the fluidity is explained by the prevalence of circular atoms, the 
formation of ice by the prevalence of acute and scalene-angled atoms etc. In the Letter to 
Pythocles, Epicurus introduces also the “multiple” or “possible method” of natural observation, 
which sums up all compatible explanations of a natural phenomenon. The facts invite the 
epistemologist to allow for a plurality of explanations, hold fest to the facts, and take a view 
analogous to them. Deficient is the method that rejects possible explanations, which stay in 
agreement with the phenomena. Any method that refrains from the requirement to provide 
explanations similar to the phenomena is nothing more than myth. Moreover, Epicurus uses 
the criterions of attestation and non-attestation, and contestation and non-contestation, as tests 
of truth, but neglects the theory of consequences. The legitimacy of inferences that project 
beyond our experience was rigorously investigated by the Epicurean Philodemus in his work 
on sign inference (Allen, 1998).  
Inference in Epicurus and Lucretius is always infallible, when it is established 
exclusively by the senses. In the verses 379-521 of the fourth book of De rerum natura, 
Lucretius indicates that false inferences are always the result of the intervention of a mental 
bias, not of sense perception. As an instance of appropriate inference that goes from the evident 
(ἐναργές) to the non-evident (ἄδηλον), Lucretius compares fall in void, thin air, and water, in 
order to infer that only the void exerts no resistance to falling bodies, letting them fall with 
equal velocity, independently of their heavier or lighter weights, disregarding Aristotle’s 
rejection of this hypothesis. This would imply also that the intervention of the infinitesimal 
swerve is a necessary explanation of alleged deviations from vertical fall in vacuum, as 
Lucretius believed (DRN, 2.224-250). Moreover, the empirical method is implemented also in 
the inference from the experience of the feeling of free-will to the atomic swerve model. 
 
 
4.1. Inference of the latent 
For if once one says that there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of 
smallness, it is not possible to conceive how this should be, and indeed how could the 
body any longer be limited in size? (Epicurus, LH, 57). 
Epicurus had tackled the difficulties with the paradoxes of the infinite, by pointing out, firstly, 
that the infinite divisibility of matter must be dismissed, since a finite body consisting of 
infinite parts is inconceivable, however small the parts may be: “For it is obvious that these 
infinite particles must be of some size or other; and however small they may be, the size of the 
body too would be infinite” (op. cit.). In the same basis, Lucretius opposed the pluralist physical 
theory of Empedocles, by confronting his false belief that “there is no end to the cutting up of 
bodies, and that no stop is made in their breaking, and indeed that there is no minimum at all 
in things” (DRN, 1.746-8). The spuriousness of Empedocles’ belief pertains to the 
presupposition of motion and bodies without void, as Lucretius supported.  
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The recognition of the indivisible nature of the atom is the outcome of conceptual, 
rational deduction of the minimum that confines any further resolution of discriminable shape 
and constituent parts (Bicknell, 1990). The existence of the indivisible sensible body is an 
entelecheia in Aristotle’s terminology, even if the paradoxical divisibility of the matter may 
still be a potentiality.16 It is noteworthy then, how consciously Lucretius argues that the concept 
of the atom presupposes not only its invisibility but also its dependency from the whole body: 
To proceed with the argument: in every body 
There is a point so small that eyes cannot see it. 
That point is without parts, and is the smallest 
Thing that can possibly exist. It has never existed 
Separately by itself, nor ever will, 
But only as one part of something else; 
(DRN, 1.599-604). 
The indivisibility of the atoms is regarded by Lucretius as a fundamental property that 
implicates their ontological priority. Since matter is the only reality, in the infinite void, the 
atoms obtain substantial significance in natural world. Their weight, shape and magnitude, 
alongside with their swerving peculiarity, are the intrinsic, elementary atomic properties, which 
cannot be further analysed, as the atoms are irreducible. The swerve permits collisions and 
compounds, as spontaneous, concurrent, and successive atomic combinations. The result is not 
only the deterministic impact of atomic collisions and rebounds, but also the generation of 
bodies with reasoning abilities.  
Epicurean philosophy did not directly reduce human behaviour and responsibility to 
atomic motion, but pointed out the intermediate differentiated development that took place. 
This development originates with the variations of atomic size (Epicurus, LH, 55), whereas the 
finest particles belong to the soul, which is enabled with sensation, in so far as it is enclosed in 
the body (op. cit. 63). The endeavoured inference from a latent infinitesimal swerve would 
have significant consequences for human autonomy. The autonomous, παρ’ ἡμᾶς action of the 
mind is a central feature of Epicurean ethics, as Mitsis (1988) stressed. Determinism is not only 
incompatible with autonomous mind but also self-refuting. Therefore, the interpretation of the 
atomic swerve as mere randomness neglects the deeper ontological content of the atomic 
theory. 
 The Lucretian argument on the swerve pertains to evidence of something that from its 
nature is hidden from perception. As Diogenes of Oenoanda (32.1.14–3.14) conveyed, 
Epicurus brought the swerve to light, “demonstrating it from evident facts” (ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων 
δείκνυσιν). The possibility to advance our knowledge of the latent (ἄδηλα) to the senses, 
through observation of evident variations, analogies, and similarities, is supported in the extant 
remains of Philodemus, with the example of the discernment between the variations of different 
fires and their common features (De signis, 23-24). We need to examine neither the whole 
amount of the phenomena nor their random appearance. We must investigate their 
homogeneities and diversities, in order to discover what is inseparably present in every part of 
the whole and allows for transition from the one part to the other (op. cit. 20-21).  
 
                                                          
16 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἅπαν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν εἶναι διαιρετὸν καθ’ ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
δυνάμει διαιρετόν, τὸ δ’ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὑπάρξει (GC 1, 2, 316b). 
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5. Spontaneity, libera voluntas, and necessity 
The Lucretian physical system is not only based on the Epicurean idealization of the atom, but 
it offers a deeper, biological explanation of atomism, in the form of the seeds of material bodies, 
such as the seeds of liquid fire that makes clouds look golden gleaming and red lightning: 
And also there’s another reason why 
That rushing golden gleam of liquid fire  
Darts down to earth. It is that the clouds themselves 
Must contain very many seeds of fire… 
Many such seeds, so with good cause they blush  
And pour out fires… 
(DRN, 6.204-211). 
The seeds are the basis of nutrition, as well; hence, they bring prosperity and advance 
civilization, but they can also be responsible for calamities, as plague and pestilence (DRN, 
6.1125 ff.). By understanding the causal role of the seeds, the humans can learn how to set 
limits to their desires and fears, in order to pursue a highest good, find out the laws of nature 
and explain the common biological causes in physical, social and cognitive phenomena. From 
a biological point of view, the soul, corresponding to the Latin anima, extends to the whole of 
the body. The mind, corresponding to the Latin animus, is found in the chest, respectively. Soul 
and mind are dispersive, since they consist of atoms finer and much more mobile than smoke, 
water or cloud, which are dispersive, as well (DRN, 3.425-444). Therefore, Lucretian 
Psychology tends to be established on a manifest biological and mechanistic explanation. But 
the intervention of the phenomenon of the swerve, as a discontinuous, infinitesimal sideways 
shift from the background atomic motion, gains a fundamental role to the generation of libera 
voluntas. The production of voluntary action has an internal origin, the deferring capacity of 
animal’s mind (animus), due to the atomic swerve. The familiar delay before any initiation of 
voluntary animal motion proves that mind is capable of free-choice, as Lucretius insisted. 
The suggestion that the slight swerve of the atoms is responsible for the production of 
libera voluntas was “the first known occurrence of the expression ‘free-will,’17 and Epicurus 
was apparently the first philosopher to explain ‘free-will’ by a discontinuity of causation,” as 
Asmis (1970: p. 1) proposed. The same claim that the free will problem was seriously 
introduced by Epicurus, had been also exposed by Huby (1967). Nevertheless, Huby 
mistakenly translated tautomaton as chance, failing thus to decipher the exact meaning of the 
Epicurean conception of the interchange between freedom and determinism. Asmis also related 
free-will with chance and rejection of necessity, not with spontaneity in necessity, as Johnson 
(2009; 2013) contends. The fault in the views of Asmis and Huby is that the concept of chance 
cannot match with the autonomous element of free-will, as self-regulation, self-governing. On 
the contrary, the notion of spontaneity is  more appropriate for the explanation of the production 
of free-choice. The proposition that free-will can be established on chance, sounds nonsensical; 
however, it does make sense to say that free-will is based on spontaneity.18 
 Regarding the introduction of the spontaneous inclination, Diogenes of Oenoanda 
(33.2) juxtaposed Democritus’ overall rejection of free atomic motion (because atomic 
collisions take place with necessity), from Epicurus’ exposition of the swerving atomic motion. 
                                                          
17 The simmering of the free will problem may be found in the Socratic tenet that no man does wrong 
spontaneously, in Plato’s Laws, in the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions in the third book of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, in Gorgias’ Helena, in Andokides’ On his return, and elsewhere. 
18 This spontaneous adherence to morality was expressed by Democritus with the following words: “Do not feel 
shame more before other people rather than oneself, and do not do bad deeds more if no one will know than if all 
people know. But feel shame most of all before yourself, and establish the law within your soul, to do nothing 
unfitting” (Ethical sayings from the collection of Stobaeus, 264). 
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Democritean determinism has been related with an alleged tendency to reduce reality to the 
atoms, by a simultaneous underrating of sensory experience as ineligible. If one reduces 
macroscopic or cognitive phenomena to underlying atomic motions, one assumes that nothing 
can supervene atomist microphysics. As a response, the atomic swerve was fostered as a model 
that tried to escape Democritean reductivist determinism. This way, however, Epicureans had 
to face other irresolvable contradictions with intrinsic ethical concepts such as responsibility, 
as Sharples (1993) observed.  
Epicurus tried to improve the atomic theory of Democritus with the notion of the 
swerve, which is a slight diversification and discontinuity of the atomic motion. Unfortunately, 
Epicurus’ conception of the swerve is not extant. Hence, Lucretius is the basic resource of 
argumentation in favour of the swerve, while Cicero being the main source of counter 
arguments. On regard of the Epicurean rejection of determinism, Hankinson (1999b: p. 525) 
observes that Epicurus rejected Democritean determinism, by suggesting that his 
argumentation is not only self-refuting, but it also nullifies ethics. Nonetheless, it is false that 
Democritus ignored ethics, as his account of deliberation shows. We should state it in a really 
clear manner, with this occasion of misunderstanding, that an attempt to reconcile Democritean 
and Epicurean causal theories cannot be fruitful; not because of the notion of the swerve, but 
because Epicurus, as a matter of fact, would prefer religion from universal determinism. Most 
likely, for the same reason, the Lucretian poem begins with a hymn to Venus. This way, the 
Epicurean deflation of determinism is reconciled with a religious worldview. 
From Epicurus to Lucretius, however, the deflation of determinism becomes more 
moderated. Lucretius emphasizes the boundary mark that necessitates events albeit the 
unpredictable atomic swerve, while Epicurus builds an ethical theory that is irreducible to the 
atomic motion. Epicurus criticized Leucippus and Democritus with the following words: “the 
first men to give a satisfactory account of causes, men not only much greater than their 
predecessors but also, many times over, than their successors, turned a blind eye to themselves 
(although in many matters they had alleviated great ills) in order to hold necessity and the 
automatic as the cause of everything” (On Nature 25; Sedley, 1983: pp. 19–23). Lucretius yet, 
giving emphasis to sensation, thought that the spontaneous atomic swerve permits mind to 
behave without an internal necessity: 
But that within the mind there’s no necessity 
Controlling all its actions, all its movements, 
Enslaving it and forcing it to suffer - 
That is brought about by the tiny swerving of atoms 
In neither place nor time determinate 
(DRN, 2.289-93) 
Quite stimulating to Lucretius was Theophrastus’19 opinion that by spontaneity (τῷ 
αὐτομάτῳ) and through the rotation of the whole we may retrieve plausible explanations of the 
acquisition of certain forms of plants and inanimate things, as Johnson (2013: pp. 102-3) points 
out. Theophrastus would also assume that spontaneity is a natural cause of this heaven and of 
all worlds.20 The concept of spontaneity, naturally expressed by the processes of the occurrence 
of streams, rivers, springs and floods, wild plants, wildfires, horses, salt crystallization, and 
human voluntary action should not be taken as causeless and random. It is described by 
Lucretius with the following words: 
If you know these things well, you’ll see at once  
That nature is free, no slave to masters proud; 
                                                          
19 Sedley (1998) also emphasized how significant was Theophrastus’ imprint on Lucretius’ thought. 
20 It is not a coincidence that Theophrastus, Straton of Lampsakos, and other philosophers, supported the theory 
of the disseminate void: “pockets of void are scattered throughout all things, and are the explanation of 
transparency, compression, and mixing” (Irby-Massie & Keyser, 2002: p. 12). 
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That nature by herself all things performs 
By her own will without the aid of gods 
(DRN, 2.1090-2).  
That is to say, the Epicurean principle of the non-intervention of gods in natural processes is 
implied by the universal spontaneity of action. Owing to its relationship to necessity, 
spontaneity is an indispensable dynamic in the natural philosophies of Democritus, Aristotle, 
Theophrastus, and Lucretius. In chapters 7-9 of the VII book of Metaphysics, Aristotle 
distinguishes three kinds of things: generated by nature, generated as an effect of art, and 
generated spontaneously. Some things are produced either by art or spontaneously, for instance, 
health. Plants and animals that are not generated from seed, they are generated spontaneously. 
In Generation of Animals (III, 11, 762a 9), Aristotle claims that spontaneous generation is the 
effect of concoction (Lennox, 2001). In reproductive generation, the principle of movement 
lies within the semen; the semen contains a movement by which the parts of the new animal 
are formed. On the contrary, in spontaneous generation, it is “that portion of the soul principle 
(psychikes arches) which gets enclosed or separated off within the pneuma [that] makes a 
fetation and implants movement (kìnesin) in it” (GA III, 11, 762b 16-18). It is evident for 
Lucretius that natural spontaneity gave birth to human agents: 
No golden chain, I think, from heaven on high 
Let down the breeds of mortals to the fields; 
Nor sea nor waves that break upon the rocks 
Created them. From the same earth they sprang… 
By her own will first made for mortal men; 
Herself gave forth sweet fruits and joyful pastures, 
Which now our toil scarce brings to growth and increase 
(DRN, 2.1153-60). 
In human voluntary action, spontaneity is expressed with the form of deliberation, as 
Democritus proposed: “It is better to deliberate (προβουλεύεσθαι) before action than to regret 
it afterwards” (Δημοκράτους Γνῶμαι, 31). Xenocrates also urged his students “to do of their 
own accord [sponte sua] what they are compelled to do by the law” (Cicero, Rep. 1.2.3). Human 
responsibility, autonomy, and freedom stem from the interplay between spontaneity and 
necessity rather than the vicissitudes of chance, destiny, or the whim of gods, as Johnson (2009) 
stresses.  
The rebuttal of teleological action in favour of spontaneous generation is implicit in the 
Lucretian concept of the atomic swerve, since without this declination “no collisions between 
primary elements would occur, and no blows would be effected, with the result that nature 
would never have created anything” (DRN, 2.223-24). The natural creative potentiality, 
therefore, originates from the swerve of the atoms. Since everything in the void moves with 
equal speed, since void can never resist to anything (op. cit. 2.235-36), the atomic swerve 
emerges as an auxiliary explanation of the observed declinations of motion. The swerve is, 
furthermore, a spontaneous movement of self-defence, by bending aside, turning away, for 
instance, when “horses would shy and swerve to avoid the tusks’ fierce onset” (op. cit. 5.1329-
30). The swerving phenomenon causes atoms to lean, bend, incline, turn, divert, drive out, drive 
away, remove, expel, put out, put off, turn aside, according to the various translations of the 
Lucretian terms “clinamen,” “declinare,” “depellere,” “inclinare.”  
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6.  Can the swerve preserve moral responsibility? 
There are some principal features of the Lucretian atomic theory that become essential for an 
understanding of the debatable relationship between responsibility and the atomic swerve. On 
the one hand, atoms are indestructible, therefore, they are considered as having very stable 
properties and capable to relate to other atoms with a regularity that produces lawful 
necessitation. On the other hand, there exist exceptions to necessitation, in the cases of atomic 
inclination and volition. Lucretius did not try to reduce volition directly to the swerve, nor the 
opposite, although he has been interpreted in solely reductionist ways by Augustine and others. 
Nevertheless, he does not avoid a generalized reduction of the mind and the soul to physicalist 
explanations, based on the atoms. The swerve is the result of the wavering of the atoms of 
infinite matter in a boundless infinite universe that has no centre. Lucretius states exactly that 
the atoms can never find rest in the unfathomably abyssal universe (DRN, 1.921-1051). His 
cosmological argumentation can imply the ethical one, only through the mediation of the 
physical concepts of the body, the soul, the mind, the external objects, the idols that the objects 
emit, their impacts (simulacra) on the soul, and their results, feelings and volition.  
 Against this line of reasoning, the opponents can either question the epistemological 
theory of the emitted simulacra and their stipulated impact on the soul, or doubt about the role 
of the swerve in the generation of volition. The counter arguments would point out that ethical 
philosophy made significant progress with Democritus, Socrates, Pythagoras, Aristotle, 
especially with the definition of the concepts of deliberation and voluntary action, and the 
clarification of the role of knowledge in responsibility. After such advancements, the allegation 
of the emergence of volition from the atomic swerve would seem as a retreat and an 
oversimplified reduction. To these critiques that tend to underscore the independent and 
irreducible status of ethical values, the Epicureans would answer by referring to the Aristotelian 
argument that the soul cannot be self-moved, but the body moves from its striving for 
something else. Aristotle renounced the philosophical views that attributed movement to the 
soul, on the grounds that the origin of movement needs not be itself moved. The most sensitive 
part of the dispute can become ostensible, if we analyze the relationship between the mind and 
the atomic swerve. Since the external objects of the world emit idols that strike the human 
senses with unsurpassable aptitude, then the mind21 would have either to be subjected to the 
impacted idols or react with a spontaneous reflex, which is identified with the atomic swerve. 
This intensive lack of resistance, which is an outcome of the swerve on the soul, makes possible 
the process of communication between bodies, namely, the traversing and perusing of the 
objects of sensation, for the purposes of cognition.  
 Nonetheless, a strenuous disagreement with the Epicurean natural explanations was 
developed by questioning the trifling role that the atomic swerve should play to the generation 
of concepts such as justice and responsibility. The slightest deviation of the atoms could not be 
responsible for the perdurance of stars and living creatures in randomness, nor for the validity 
of the principle of free will, as Plutarch (“The cleverness of animals,” Moralia, 964C) judged. 
The gift of reason distinguishes humans from other animals, on the basis of their ability to 
establish justice in their social relations. By contrast, the atomic swerve doctrine leads to a 
treacherous and precipitous way of living, which permits wrangling and devastating evident 
veracities, rather than obeying and learning the Platonic rules and arguing according to obvious 
truths, as Plutarch wished.  
 This is a powerful argument, which the Epicureans would have difficulties to oppose. 
The same topic is mentioned in the essay On the generation of the soul in the Timaeus (Moralia, 
1012B ff.), where Plutarch states that the Stoics rejected the Epicurean concept of the swerve 
                                                          
21 “Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus say that perception and thought arise when images enter from outside; 
neither occurs to anybody without an image impinging” (Aetius, IV, 8, 10; Kirk & Raven, 1957).  
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on the grounds that it pertains to an uncaused motion that originates from nothing (op. cit. 
1015C). More importantly, in the Stoic self-contradictions, Plutarch introduces the expression 
“adventitious motion” (ἐπελευστικὴν κίνησιν), which is contrived into the reasoning faculty, by 
some philosophers, who suppose that external influences impact the impulses (Moralia, 1045 
ff.). This corresponds to a swerve that motivates the soul to choose between two 
indistinguishable stimuli, which Chrysippus called it “random choice” and “chance inclination 
of the mind.” For this reason, Plutarch describes the swerve as an artifice that devises the 
liberation of volition from the everlasting motion (Moralia, 1050B-C).  
 Moreover, in the face of the Chrysippean argument that nothing happens without a 
cause, the examination of the role of the atomic swerve for the preservation of responsibility 
can also have great significance. If the atomic swerve were responsible for the motion of the 
passions of the soul, it should be impossible to conceive any kind of ratio in passions. There 
would be a purposeless irritation, alienated from reasoning. The soul would be reasonless. On 
the contrary, if reason plays a role in the generation of the passions of the soul, why do some 
people hold wicked passions? How can passions take place without judgement, although they 
actually pertain to judgements? Which is the cause of this reasonless motion of the passions? 
The result, hereby, is a vicious circle that Chrysippus could not avoid, as it was pointed out by 
Galen (De Plac. IV, 389).  
 Last but not least, when voluntas is actually comprised of passions, its compatibility 
with reason and responsibility directs us to an outstanding moral problematic. Given that 
Epicurus had a significant contribution to moral philosophy, one could yet wonder how the 
atomic swerve could be connected to all this. Although it is interesting to hypothesize that soul 
and mind consist of fine particles, such as the ones conjectured by the Epicureans, this 
hypothesis, however, does not seem very helpful to answer the question: “How passions and 
voluntas can depend to reason and responsibility?” On the contrary, the atomic turmoil has 
often provided an “excuse” for the rejection of responsibility.  
Theoretical inventiveness cannot be steadily infallible. Atomism proposed that the 
primary and simplest natural elements were atoms. The concept of the atom was yet criticized 
by Galen and Hippocrates on the basis of its restricted diversification and its inapplicability to 
the elementary composition of flesh (σάρξ). The atoms do not obtain naturally any corporeal 
quality, such as whiteness, blackness, coldness, hotness, but only shape, repercussion and 
weight (σχῆμα… ἀντιτυπία καὶ βάρος). “I say that, if man were one, he could never feel pain,” 
argued Hippocrates.22 Pain could never occur if the primary element were only one, as the 
atom, because the one is not mutable to otherness, while the immutable being impassive and 
painless. If the primary element of flesh were one, there would never be pain. Yet there is pain. 
Therefore, the primary element of flesh is not one. 
 
7. Critique and conclusions 
From our own aspect spontaneous, from the aspect of the cause non-spontaneous 
(Hippocrates, cited by Galen, De plac. IV, 393, 14). 
Many interpreters point out that the Aristotelian distinction between voluntary and compulsory 
action had influence on the Epicurean theory of free-will. In his Letter to Menoeceus, 132-3, 
Epicurus insisted on the significance of prudence, as the ability of a better man to laugh at 
destiny and attain the power to determine events. He also wrote: “That which is in our power 
is subject to no master, and blame and praise are applicable to this.” The same point, on the 
attachment of praise and blame to voluntary, but not involuntary actions, was made by Aristotle 
                                                          
22 Galen, De constitutione artis medicae, 7, Vol. I, p. 245 K (Arnim, 1964: pp. 137-8) 
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in Nicomachean Ethics (Γ 1, 1109 b 30-34). Therefore, one should interpret the Epicurean free-
will as autonomous, spontaneous fondness rather than chaotic randomness.  
The allegedly Epicurean conception of indeterminist freedom of choice or decision was 
revoked by Bobzien (2000), in favour of agent autonomy, as an appropriate interpretation of 
Epicurean ethics. Bobzien gave emphasis to the fact that Epicurus did never use the expression 
“freedom of will,” but only the term παρ’ ἡμᾶς in the Letter to Menoeceus 133-4 (to distinguish 
between necessity, chance, and responsibility) and On Nature 25. That is to say, Epicurus did 
not support an indeterministic two-sided freedom of will or freedom of decision. On the 
contrary, either the agent should be responsible for an action or something else. The expression 
παρ’ ἡμᾶς means “because of us,” “due to us.” After all, Epicurus maintained a conception of 
freedom established in necessitation: “The greatest fruit of autarky is freedom” (Epicurus, 
Gnomologium Vaticanum, 77).  
Comparing the Epicurean conception of freedom in autarky and the Lucretian 
argumentation on the swerve, we find out that Lucretius tended to justify volition under the 
influence of a rather reductionist physicalism. Lucretian argumentation implies that free-action 
originates from the atomic swerve, which identifies as a natural effect of the lack of any 
resistance to the motion of infinite matter in infinite void space. This failure to exercise 
resistance to motion is not only a possible precursor of the concept of inertia, but also the cause 
of the creative power of Nature, and the generation of volition in living beings. The argument 
is based on an analogy between motion, creation, and volition: The universal motion of infinite 
matter finds no resistance from the infinitely abyssal universe, generating, hence, 
unsurpassable creative resources, which become so competent that they can crisscross and 
discern between different and opposite directions in empty space, giving thus birth to variety 
and volition.  
Motion in a void space is transition in a totally unresisting medium that permits atoms 
to obtain unassailable velocity, faster than light, either in gravitational descent or in collisions. 
The atoms do not only move without any resistance, but they obtain also a momentum through 
their collisions that is never absorbable, due to their great solidity. The effect is that universal 
motion is incorporated into every indestructible solid atom. The resulting swerve is a latent 
deviation from their path, to the minimum possible amount, a minimal spatial quantum, before 
they revert to their normal direction. However, the swerve itself is definitely non-observable 
(ἄδηλον), it is only inferred from an observable delay in animal reactions that betrays their 
attempt to grasp their object of desire, before they act.  
Apart from the swerve, there exist also the regular effects of the weight of the bodies 
and the impact of the simulacra as an external force. Whereas weight and simulacra being 
responsible for determinate effects, the atomic swerve should be considered as a spontaneous 
cause that permits living beings to act in an autonomous way, argue the Epicureans. It is clear 
that “chance also and spontaneity are reckoned among causes: many things are said both to be 
and to come to be because of chance and spontaneity,” as Aristotle (Phys. II 4) contended.  
However, the alleged spontaneity of the atomic swerve could be nothing more than an 
epiphenomenon. Spontaneity, in fact, can only be considered as posterior to nature and mind, 
as the latter are prior causes to the universe and of many things in it besides. A logical argument, 
therefore, is that the heavenly sphere could not have arisen spontaneously from an atomic 
swerve, but efficiently, such as an olive tree comes from a seed and a man from another. Thus, 
Aristotle distinguishes between the determinate causes of a thing and the indeterminate causes 
that are incidental. That which is per se cause of the effect is determinate, but the incidental 
cause is indeterminable, “for the possible attributes of an individual are innumerable” (ἄπειρα 
γάρ ἐν τᾦ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, Phys. II 5). Chance is an incidental cause in intentional action. Strictly 
speaking chance is not the cause of anything. Chance is something contrary to the rule. Chance 
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occurs in indefinite many ways. Thought and nature retain a priority over chance, because they 
operate in a teleological manner (Phys. II 6).23  
Aside from this, scrutinized critique might uncloak the atomic swerve as the outcome 
of determinate causes, such as collisions, rebounds, and the simulacra. What evidence could 
oblige us to recognize the action of an indeterminate atomic swerve? It could be only a reaction 
triggered by passions, as angst. However, conscious behaviour is much more complicated than 
passions, including sophisticated processes, such as decision-making, that cannot be 
established in declination alone. There would be, hence, impossible to behave responsibly, if 
everything would be the effect of arbitrary atomic swerving of passions, out of rational control. 
An infinitesimal spontaneity could never preserve responsible action. From the aspect of 
philosophical ethics, an allegedly spontaneous swerve could be dismissed as a non-justified 
hypothesis. The rational decision-making required in ethics, could be successfully 
implemented, only by argumentation based on justified non-spontaneous causes, based on clear 
evidence and unswerving reason.  
The swerve was proposed as a getaway from fate. There would be no place for 
responsibility in a deterministic universe, as many scholars suggested. Even if this were true, 
the attempted resolution of the problem of freedom and responsibility with the proposal of an 
atomic swerve still misses out responsible agency. The swerve of the atoms of body, soul, and 
mind could probably explain indeterminant and defiant behaviour, but not original free-will 
and responsibility. Only in a universe where passions predominate can the atomic swerve be a 
suitable cause of the observed behaviour. In that case, should we really believe that passions 
constitute an unsurpassable limit for human reasoning? Is this probably an irony, with tragic 
repercussions sometimes? But Epicurus and Lucretius really believed that free-will can be 
sustained as a natural product of passions, namely, pleasures.  
Lucretius wanted to emphasize the prevalent role of pleasure and inclination in natural 
science, ethics and philosophy; for this reason, he paralleled free-will with the uncertain atomic 
swerve, while stressing that the nature of the mind and the soul is bodily, as mind and soul 
suffer and share their feelings together with the body (DRN, 3.167-9). Lucretius claimed that 
the mind consists of very fine in texture, smooth, round and very tiny particles (DRN, 3.179-
180) that move with incomparable swiftness, when smitten by a little impulse. The mind bestirs 
itself more nimbly than anything in the world, so fast as the water moves but not as honey. The 
smaller and smoother of the mind-particles consist of shapes so tiny that can transmit sensation 
among the limbs, with the gradual mediation of heat, wind and air. The failure of this Lucretian 
explanation comes from the hidden premise that only airy and fluid particles could boost the 
function of the mind, while nowadays neurology proposes some different models.  
In conclusion, the origin of the model of the infinitesimal swerve of particles was the 
outcome of Lucretius’ struggle to discover the necessary and sufficient reasons of alteration 
and coming-to-be, in Aristotle’s words; of generation and corruption in physics and 
psychology. Pondering the philosophical schools of his times, Aristotle admitted that only 
Democritus had penetrated with careful manner and competent method to the problem of 
alteration and coming-to-be. Democritus explained coming-to-be in terms of association and 
dissociation of shapes. He also explained alteration in terms of order and position of shapes, as 
Aristotle (GC 1, 2) delivered. From this perspective, the doctrine of the atomic swerve must 
have its origin in the application of the method of exhaustion to the Democritean analysis of 
                                                          
23 The distinction between chance and spontaneity, is based on the greater extension of the concept spontaneity, 
whereas chance is related specifically with the deliberate action that results to something that happens in vain. 
Spontaneity is the wider term, while “chance and what results from chance are appropriate to agents that are 
capable of good fortune and of moral action generally. Therefore, necessarily chance is in the sphere of moral 
actions… The spontaneous on the other hand is found both in the lower animals and in many inanimate objects” 
(Phys. II 6). 
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the shapes of matter as causes of coming-to-be and alteration. The minimal modifications of 
shape can represent instantiations of the slope in variations of motion, collisions, compounds-
formation, just as in the generation of volition. Clearly, responsibility is impossible to be 
successfully preserved by such an embryonic physical-mathematical approach. If one would 
still insist on some kind of mystical tight linkage between the atomic swerve and free-action, 
he should have to explain what sorts of free-action could be expected, without an adequate 
justification of responsibility.  
One might suppose that the atomic swerve model could stimulate varied pursuits that 
would deflect philosophical research either to ethics or to natural philosophy, as attempts to try 
and learn new approaches to understand nature and human behavior. However, the archaic 
echoing of De Rerum Natura that praises “Mother Earth and Father Sky” (DRN, 1.250 ff.), 
while seeking for Epicurean joy, the “sweet sense of pleasure” and “things that take pain away” 
(DRN, 2.1 ff.), can still not explain how the atomic swerve could effectively preserve at least 
pleasure, happiness or any comparable aim.  
It becomes evident, therefore, that Lucretius rejects the pursuit of any other goal, aside 
from pleasure, relegating thus his argument to a wishful preservation of pleasure by the atomic 
swerve. The Lucretian argument can be reformulated in the following way: “The striving for 
pleasure implies the unobservable existence of the atomic swerve.” Although this imaginary 
conception of an atomic swerve would tempt to appear as a shelter against emergent 
deterministic threats, it is yet from a rational, pragmatist, utilitarian point of view completely 
unjustifiable.  
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